



ATAMODELUN

Crisis
**Crisis Committee:
Battle of Sekigahara**

Sekigahara
STUDY GUIDE

Table of Contents

1. Letter from the Secretary General
2. Letter from the Under Secretary General
3. Letter from the Academic Assistant
4. Procedure
 - a. *What is a CC Committee*
 - Directive*
 - Updates*
 - Crises*
 - b. *Directive Types and How to Write Them*
 - Personal Directive*
 - Joint Directive*
 - Committee Directive*
 - Intelligence Directive*
 - Top Secret*
 - Press Release (Declamation)*
 - c. *Procedure of the Committee*
 - Roll Call*
 - Tour de Table*
 - Semi-moderated Caucus*
 - Unmoderated Caucus*
5. Introduction of the committee
6. Major Powers
 - a. The Eastern Army
 - b. The Western Army
7. historical context
- 8.. Neutralizing Mt. Nangu
- 9.. The Decisive Betrayal
10. Aftermath of the war
11. Bibliography

1. Letter From Secretary General:

Dear Delegates,

It is our distinct honor and privilege to welcome you all to ATAMUN '2026. On behalf of the Secretariat and the Executive Board, we extend our warmest greetings as we prepare to embark on an exceptional journey defined by constructive debate, diplomatic negotiation, and global problem-solving.

This year marks a monumental step forward for our conference. We are exceptionally proud to announce our affiliations with Yale Model United Nations (Y MUN LIII) and Oxford Global. These partnerships underscore our unwavering commitment to maintaining world-class academic standards, fostering international educational exchange, and offering our delegates a diplomatic experience rooted in the highest global benchmark of MUN excellence.

This Study Guide has been meticulously drafted by the Academic Team of Battle of Sekigahara to provide you with a comprehensive, nuanced foundation for your committee deliberations. It outlines the core historical context, key political dynamics, and central questions facing your respective committees. We strongly encourage you to immerse yourselves in your delegation's foreign policy, push the boundaries of innovative policymaking, and engage with the debate in a spirit of true diplomatic leadership.

We wish you a fruitful and rewarding preparation process, and we eagerly look forward to seeing the impactful debates you will lead at ATAMUN '2026.

Warmest regards,

Kerem Veysel Düzgün & Hasan Arif Ege Başkurt

Co-Secretaries-General, ATAMUN '2026

2. Letter From Under Secretary General:

Dear delegates,

I am Efe Koçoğlu. I am a senior student at Muhittin Mustafa Böcek Anatolian High School. I had the delight of participating in Model United Nations conferences. These conferences taught me how to see from different perspectives, how to debate, and how to make instant decisions. I also gained valuable friendships in my MUN career.

I am welcoming you all to this glorious committee, CC, the battle of Sekigahara. This was my dream committee, and my dear academic team, also my friend Çağın, helped me through this journey. I really hope you have so much fun and learn new things from this committee. As the undersecretary general of this committee, I want you to read this study guide very carefully. Don't hesitate to ask me; I am online 24/7. We expect glorious things from you. There is no light without a shadow; there is no future without the past.

Efe Koçoğlu

Co-Under Secretary General of CC: The Battle of Sekigahara

Tel: +90 555 061 15 05

Mail: kocogluefe7@gmail.com

3. Letter From Academic Assistant:

Dear delegates

First of all, welcome to this committee. I won't keep this long. First, I would like to thank the Executive team for organizing this conference and inviting us. Then, I would also like to extend my thanks to my brother Efe. We are continuing on the same path.

My only request is that you read the study guide, and please don't hesitate to contact me if you have any problems.

Tel no 546 225 05 65

cagin.o.b@gmail.com

1. What is a CC Committee

A crisis cabinet is a specialized committee that replicates decision-making during a crisis. Individual delegates or members inside the Crisis Cabinet provide directives to guide their actions and responses to the crisis. Delegates use directives to propose specific courses of action, tactics, or policies to handle the situation. Depending on the committee structure and the course of actions currently happening in the committee, these directives can take many forms, such as individual, joint, committee, intelligence, top secret directive, and press release.

2. Directive Types and How to Write Them

Individual Directive:

When an action is within your character's authority or is achievable due to their abilities, you write personal commands. To begin, there is a format for writing directives; so, you must state who is sending the directive and to whom it is being sent (from, to). Following that, whose cabinet is sending the directive, followed by the time and current date of the committee. Finally, the format of your directive and its title. That's all there is to it; this is the only format you need to know to write a directive. The only thing left is the content of your directive, and the way through which you compose it is fairly simple; You write it by answering the what, why, when, who, where, and, most crucially, how questions. You write the action you want to take by answering the WH questions and then elaborating and discussing it as much as possible to make your plan as thorough as feasible.

Also, whenever possible, employ the future tense. On paper, a directive looks like this:

From: Menelaus

Personal Directive

Date: 1192BC

May 3

To: Related Authorities

Capturing Tiryns

Time: 12.34

(Spartan Cabinet)

What: I will capture Tiryns with my 5,000 men stationed on the Tiryns frontline. My soldiers will kill and destroy any enemy forces they come across, as well as any enemy military bases. Women and children in the city will not be murdered unless they attack the soldiers.

To reduce noise, the 5,000 agoge soldiers will be divided into 50 groups, with 200 soldiers per group. Each group will have a commander, and the commanders will be the best warriors among their groups. They will be well-armed with their hoplons, xiphos, and dorus (Spartan agoge soldiers' shields, spearheads, and small swords). Each group will apply the doctrine properly to face the fewest casualties. If needed, 3 soldiers from each group will bring supplies to their own group from the frontlines, and these 3 soldiers will be picked randomly from the commanders. They will use the

safest route and avoid the enemy. Our men will take the safe paths suggested by our spies.

Why: Tiryns plays a crucial role in the war, and it must be captured in order to cut the enemy's supply lines.

When: Soldiers will charge at 02.00 a.m. to catch the enemy off guard.

Who: I will be operating this attack, and if I fall during the war, my right-hand man, Analus, will take over. 5,000 agoge soldiers will assault the enemy.

Where: 2,500 of my soldiers will charge from the southeast frontline, and the other 2,500 will charge from the west to capture Tiryns.

How*: Soldiers will check and control their weapons before charging. They will pray, remember how brave they are, and then honour their nation and gods by demolishing the enemy. They will not disobey their commander's orders and apply the doctrine as they say. To avoid being affected by attrition, our soldiers will study their geographical situation as well as the enemy's to use in their favour. Soldiers will use an offensive phalanx formation when I order them to charge, and they will slaughter each enemy troop they face. They will use the offensive formation until they face a larger enemy force to quickly capture as many critical areas as possible. If they face a larger enemy force, to be exact, 1.5 times larger than them, they will quickly change to a defensive phalanx formation and wait for recruitment whilst defending themselves. Their priority will be killing the enemy rather than cutting supply lines. In mountain areas, they will use the highlands in their favour and quickly oppress the enemy to finish them. Once they reach the city, their priority will be killing the cabinet members of Tiryns. If possible, they will defenestrate them to entertain themselves. After the military bases and the city are captured, soldiers will go to the possible conflict areas to recruit other soldiers. Even though we sent spies before, our soldiers will be vigilant for any kind of trap. Their main objective is to capture the city, and for that purpose, they will sacrifice themselves without hesitation.

Joint Directive:

Directives written by more than one individual are considered joint directives. You write joint directives when you can only achieve your purpose in the directive by

utilizing the authority of other cabinet members. Assume you are the commander of the army, and you want to take Warsaw. Yet you understand that conquering it without air superiority would be impossible, so you write a joint directive with the general of the air force. So it makes the "from:" part your name and the general of the air forces' name, and instead of a personal directive you write a Joint Directive. Everything else is the same.

Committee Directive:

A committee directive is written when you wish to use everyone's authority or when you are about to deliver your final directive (in most cases). Delegates frequently ask me, "How are we meant to write a committee directive with the other cabinet?" But that's just a common misunderstanding. You write the committee directive with your cabinet; the formal name is "Committee Directive," but it is basically a cabinet directive. So, simply writing a Committee Directive to the "from:" part will do.

Intelligence Directive:

You write intelligence directives when you want to acquire the necessary information about you or your country/cabinet. The format is exactly the same, except for the "WH Questions" part. For example:

From: Winston Churchill	Intelligence Directive	Date: 1942 May 3
To: Crisis Team	Our Troop Counts	Time: 16.21

(The Great Britain Cabinet)

How many troops does our country have? Do we possess any nuclear weapons? How many of our military factories are assigned to manufacture infantry weapons, and what kind of weapons are they producing?

Top Secret:

Top Secret directives are those that your chair is not allowed to read. You hand over your Top Secret directive to the admin. They are written precisely the same, but you must fold your paper and write "TOP SECRET" on the back side of it. The major reason for writing a Top Secret Directive is treason, a diabolical strategy to crash one's own cabinet or to switch sides. For instance, if a person secretly kills his cabinet members and becomes the dictator, the winning condition changes and only that person wins, whereas the cabinet loses. But I don't recommend writing Top Secret Directives unless you're planning on writing a brilliant 10-page long directive, because failing to do so will backfire much worse. You will earn your cabinet's distrust, and you may die and be given an insignificant character. Furthermore, updates to the Top Secret Directives are only sent to the person who sent them, unless they directly affect the other cabinet members.

3. Procedure of the Committee

The Crisis Cabinet (JCC) procedure stands as a captivating and immersive experience that transcends the boundaries of traditional committee simulations. As delegates assume the roles of influential government officials and prominent leaders, they find themselves thrust into the heart of rapidly evolving crises, where decisions carry weight and consequences are immediate. The SCC format showcases the art of crisis management, diplomacy, and collaboration, as participants grapple with fictional or historical scenarios that demand quick thinking and decisive action. Within the exclusive confines of a smaller, select committee, delegates navigate the intricacies of international conflicts, natural disasters, political upheavals, and military interventions, unveiling the true essence of leadership and strategic decision-making.

Tour De Table:

In Model United Nations (MUN) crises committees, "tour de table" is a term used to describe a specific procedure or phase of the committee session. It is a French term that translates to "turn of the table" in English.

During a tour de table, each delegate representing a country or entity in the committee takes turns speaking and sharing their country's or entity's stance, opinions, or

proposed actions on the crisis at hand. This process allows all delegates to express their views and contribute to the discussion in a structured and organized manner.

A tour de table is often used at the beginning of a crisis committee session or at crucial points during the committee's work to gauge the positions and perspectives of each delegation. It helps set the stage for further debate, collaboration, and negotiation among delegates as they work to find solutions to the crisis. In a typical tour de table, the chair or moderator of the committee will go around the room or call upon delegates in a specific order to speak. Each delegate is given a limited time (usually around 1-2 minutes) to make their statement. This process ensures that all countries or entities have an equal opportunity to be heard and participate actively in the committee's discussions.

Semi-moderated Caucus: Unlike moderated caucuses, delegates in a semi-moderated caucus are allowed to speak without the chair's permission, as long as they do not interrupt other cabinet members and treat each other with respect.

Unmoderated Caucus:

In an unmoderated caucus, delegates are free to draft any kind of paper they want to achieve their goals and support others. The majority of the cabinet's time should be spent on unmoderated caucuses rather than semi-moderated.

Unlike the General Assembly committees, at a Joint Crisis Committee, the sessions proceed with semi-moderated caucuses and unmoderated caucuses. The reason for that is to have a more smooth experience. Since the participants of a Joint Crisis Committee have already had a few experiences with how committees and MUN conferences proceed, semi- and unmoderated caucuses are to advance the efficiency of debates, thus making crucial and quick decisions. It was mentioned earlier, but directives are the primary reason that a JCC's procedure is so unique. So later on with the sessions based on your chair's initiative, you needn't take one or two semi-moderated caucuses before an unmoderated caucus to write directives; directly voting for an unmoderated caucus before moderates will be allowed to continue writing directives.

On a Joint Crisis Committee, after the roll call and Tour de Table, delegates take

semi-moderated caucuses to discuss future actions, strategies, and plans. After determining their move, delegates write down the designated act to put into practice. There isn't a general speakers' list, resolution paper, or opening speech.

Imperial Edicts and Declarations (Ancient Press Releases)

In a contemporary committee, you would be using press releases to address the general public about any actions or situations. You can use press releases for propaganda to cleanse your own image, or black propaganda to tarnish somebody else's image. You can rally the commoner to join the army or try to break apart your opponent's military.

A press release is as its name implies, an act of publishing media. Press releases are important as a ruler is only as powerful as their flock is loyal.

Now in the BCE the printing press or modern media obviously didn't exist. Yet rulers and people in positions of power have always utilized the power of controlling and speaking to the public. This can be done through declarations and edicts.

Imagine a marketplace in ancient times; you've seen it in a lot of movies. Some guy with a fanfare trots in on a horse and plays his tune, then proceeds to read loudly off a piece of parchment addressing the people in the name of the ruler. This is basically what a declaration is. The where, when, and how are, of course, subject to your imagination, and your creativity is the limit. You may choose to deliver speeches yourself at an important ceremony or in front of your army to boost morale or approval of some sort. You may organize a whole event just for your declaration to be read. Just be creative.

An edict, on the other hand, is a little different. While a declaration is a mere giving of information, something you'd just listen to, an edict is an official order. A press release might say; Come and join your military now to help us beat our foul opponents and save your motherland from invasion!

An edict will say, By the ruler's authority, conscription has begun. Every man capable of holding a weapon must check in for further procedures at the nearest military outpost in the next week. Citizens who fail to cooperate shall be punished.

Think of it as a “could/should” and a "must." Edicts are direct orders and might even be regarded as legislature. You might issue edicts to conscript members to your army, protect certain areas or properties, protect intellectual property, ban certain things, allow certain things, etc. They’re basically laws in short. ,

5. Introduction of the committee

As a crisis committee, the goal is saving your country and your honor. Fighting is your only option and your only change. Delegates will be the western army. The goal is to secure the previous emperor's honor and his legacy.

The time will be the end of the Sengoku era. With this war, you’ll decide if the Sengoku era will finish or it will continue. This battle led directly to the creation of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which ruled Japan from 1603 to 1868. This period is known as the Edo Period.

As the delegates, your actions will decide if this is going to happen. Even a legend says that on the foggy morning of the battle, many commanders hesitated about which side to support. When Kobayakawa finally attacked, the uncertainty vanished, and the fate of Japan was effectively decided within a few hours.

For samurai history enthusiasts, the Sengoku Era is fascinating because it combines political intrigue, legendary warriors, castle sieges, betrayals, and the dramatic rise of Tokugawa Ieyasu from hostage child to ruler of Japan.

After the death of Grand Emperor Hideyoshi, the throne is now empty. You need to protect it at all costs. Your enemy is the eastern army, which is led by Tokugawa Ieyasu. His army and his knowledge are making him almost unstoppable, but people and your army are trusting you. Once the war finishes, you need to take political actions also.

In these political decisions you need to ask yourself this question:

- *Who is going to lead the Japanese Empire?*
- *Is the new leader capable of ruling?*
- *Was I not capable enough of ruling?*
- *Who is an ally and who is an enemy?*

6. Major Powers

a. Eastern Army

The leader of the eastern army, Tokugawa Ieyasu (born Matsudaira Takechiyo, January 31, 1543–June 1, 1616), was a Japanese samurai, daimyo, and the founder and first shogun of the Tokugawa shogunate of Japan, which ruled from 1603 until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. He was the third of the three "Great Unifiers" of Japan, along with his former lord Oda Nobunaga and fellow Oda subordinate Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The son of a minor daimyo, Ieyasu once lived as a hostage under daimyo Imagawa Yoshimoto on behalf of his father. He later succeeded as daimyo after his

father's death, serving as ally, vassal, and general of the Oda clan and building up his strength under Oda Nobunaga.

After Oda Nobunaga's death, Ieyasu was briefly a rival of Toyotomi Hideyoshi before declaring his allegiance to Toyotomi and fighting on his behalf. Under Toyotomi, Ieyasu was relocated to the Kanto plains in eastern Japan, away from the Toyotomi power base in Osaka. He built his castle in the fishing village of Edo (now Tokyo). He became the most powerful daimyo and the most senior officer under the Toyotomi regime. Ieyasu preserved his strength during Toyotomi's failed attempts to conquer Korea. After Hideyoshi's death and the Battle of Sekigahara, Ieyasu seized power in 1600.

He received appointment as shōgun in 1603 and voluntarily resigned from his position in 1605, although he still held de facto control of the government until his death in 1616. He implemented a set of careful rules known as the bakuhan system. This system used precisely graded rewards and punishments to encourage (or compel) the daimyo and samurai to live in peace with each other under the Tokugawa shogunate. Following his death, his successors shifted the government to Edo (Tokyo) in 1638 and enacted the Sakoku policy of isolationism in 1639, which closed off Japan from the outside world for over 200 years until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Under Emperor Meiji, the Japanese had rapidly modernized and industrialized, transforming into a formidable military power that expanded its influence into East Asia. By 1894, disputes over control of the Korean Peninsula erupted into the First Sino-Japanese War to secure their dominance in the region at the Battle of Pyongyang and the Yalu River, as Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910 to become Chōsen, while the Japanese named the city Heijō (now Pyongyang) until it was liberated, following the atomic bomb of Hiroshima in 1945.

In 1576, Naomasa fought for the first time in the battle against Takeda Katsuyori's forces at Shibahara (芝原) in Tōtōmi Province. Later Naomasa was seen alongside Ieyasu's Hatamoto vanguards, alongside Honda Tadakatsu and Sakakibara Yasumasa.

At the age of 18, Naomasa participated in the Tokugawa army attack on Tanaka Castle, which was guarded by the Takeda clan general named Ichijō Nobutatsu. In this battle, Naomasa fought together with Matsudaira Ietada, Sakakibara Yasumasa, and Honda Tadakatsu as they all climbed to Tanaka Castle's wall and fought Nobutatsu's soldiers.

In 1578, at the age of 18, Naomasa was given control of 10,000 koku of domain due to unspecified distinguished military merit during that year. Later, Arthur Lindsay Sadler wrote that at the age of 19, Naomasa gained attention for his first notable performance in battle.

In 1580, at the age of 20, he was given a domain worth of 20,000 koku. It was noted that in the past, when the Ii clan fell into decline, its vassals abandoned and hid in the mountains, but with Naomasa's rise in power, they began to return one after another. The Ii clan records that "Nakano Echigo-no-kami, Okuyama Rokurozaemon, and other long-time vassals of the Ii clan had fled to the mountains, but they all came down to serve Naomasa. " In another case, Okuyama Rokurozaemon's younger brother, Soka, who had retired and become a monk, was ordered by Naomasa to return to secular life and was granted 1,000 koku to manage.

Later, at the age of 22, Naomasa performed another distinguishing military service against the Takeda clan at the Siege of Takatenjin in 1581. It was said that during this period, Naomasa gained Ieyasu's favor due to his blood relation with Lady Tsukiyama, Ieyasu's legal wife.

In 1582, after the Honnoji Incident, Naomasa accompanied Ieyasu on an arduous journey to escape the enemies of Nobunaga in Sakai and return to Mikawa. However, their journey was very dangerous due to the existence of "Ochimusha-gari" groups across the route. During this journey, Naomasa and other senior Ieyasu retainers such as Sakai Tadatsugu and Honda Tadakatsu fought their way through raids and harassment from Ochimusha-gari (samurai hunter) outlaws during their march

escorting Ieyasu, sometimes advancing by usage of gold and silver bribes given to some of the more amenable Ochimusha-gari groups. As they reached Kada, an area between Kameyama town and Iga, the attacks from Ochimushagari finally ended as they reached the territory of Kōka ikki Jizamurai warriors, who were friendly to the Tokugawa clan. The Koka ikki warriors then escorted the group while assisting them by eliminating the threats of the Ochimushagari outlaws until they reached Iga Province, where they were further protected by samurai clans from the Iga ikki, which then accompanied the Ieyasu group until they safely reached Mikawa. The Ietada nikki journal has recorded that the escorts of Ieyasu suffered around 200 casualties, and only 34 people were left when they finally arrived at Ietada's residence in Mikawa.

After Ieyasu's return to Mikawa, the Tenshō-Jingo War broke out between the Tokugawa clan and the Hōjō clan in a contest to gain control of the area of Shinano Province, the Ueno region, and Kai Province (currently Gunma Prefecture), which had been vacant since the destruction of the Takeda clan and the death of Oda Nobunaga. Ieyasu led an army of 8,000 soldiers entering Kai, Shinano Province, and Ueno to annex it. However, the Hōjō clan in the Kantō region also led an army of 55,000 men and crossed the Usui Pass to invade Shinano Province. In the battle of Wakamiko, 8,000 Tokugawa soldiers fought against around 50,000 soldiers of the Hōjō led by Hōjō Ujinao. Ii Naomasa was recorded as participating in these engagements. In the middle of this conflict, Naomasa further managed to recruit more samurais that had formerly served various Takeda generals such as Ichijō Nobutatsu, Yamagata Masakage, Masatsune Tsuchiya, and Hara Masatane with the help of a former Takeda clan retainer named Kimata Morikatsu, who organized the contacts of those samurais with Naomasa. Aside from military service, Naomasa played a diplomatic role during this conflict, as he received around 41 letters from many former Takeda clan vassals to submit to Ieyasu. In total, more than 800 vassals of the Takeda clan from Kofu Province were recruited by Ieyasu during the fight against the Hōjō, which lasted for 80 days. In the final phase of this conflict, Naomasa participated in the battle of Kurokoma, where the smaller Tokugawa army managed to defeat the much larger

Hōjō armies, despite being reinforced by 10,000 soldiers by the Satomi clan from Awa Province (Chiba). From November to January of the following year, Naomasa worked together with another Tokugawa general, Torii Mototada, and two former Takeda clan generals who now joined the Tokugawa clan's ranks, Hoshina Masanao and Suwa Yoritada, to attack Chikuma District, which was controlled by a Hōjō clan vassal named Ogasawara Sadayoshi. By February 10, Sadayoshi surrendered and joined the Tokugawa side. The result of this war, combined with the defection of Sanada Masayuki to the Tokugawa side, has forced the Hōjō clan to negotiate a truce with Ieyasu. The Hōjō clan then sent Hōjō Ujinobu as its representative, while the Tokugawa sent Naomasa as its representative to negotiate the peace conditions.

According to the Meishō genkō-roku record, after the conflict with the Hōjō clan, Ieyasu organized a kishōmon (blood oath) with many samurai clans that formerly were vassals of the Takeda clan assigned under the command of Tokugawa clan retainers. Ieyasu Tokugawa planned to subduct the largest portions of former Takeda samurai under Naomasa's command, having consulted and reached agreement with Sakai Tadatsugu, a senior Tokugawa clan vassal. However, Ieyasu's decision garnered protest from Sakakibara Yasumasa, who went so far as to threaten Naomasa. Tadatsugu immediately defended the decision of Ieyasu in response and warned Yasumasa that if he did any harm to Naomasa, Tadatsugu would personally slaughter the Sakakibara clan; thus, Yasumasa heeded Tadatsugu and did not protest further. Then Ieyasu decided to assign 70 members of former Takeda samurais from the Tsuchiya clan under the command of Ii Naomasa. During this year, Naomasa was also given an increase of his domain to 40,000 koku.

Later, in 1583, Naomasa sent a detachment of former Takeda samurai who originated from Kai and were led by his subordinate, Kimata Morikatsu, to invade the Takatō area of Shinano province and subdue an area there that had still not submitted to the Tokugawa clan.

b. Western Army

The leader of the western army Mitsunari was born in 1559 in northern Ōmi Province (current Nagahama City, Shiga Prefecture), as the second son of Ishida Masatsugu, a retainer for the Azai clan. His childhood name was Sakichi (佐吉).

The Ishida withdrew from service after the Azai's defeat in 1573 at the Siege of Odani Castle. According to legend, Mitsunari was a monk in a Buddhist temple before serving Toyotomi Hideyoshi, but the accuracy of this legend is doubtful, as it was first recorded during the Edo period.

In 1577, Mitsunari met Toyotomi Hideyoshi, when the former was still young and the latter was the daimyō of Nagahama. Later, Mitsunari became one of Hideyoshi's samurai officers. When Hideyoshi engaged in a campaign in the Chūgoku region, Mitsunari assisted his lord in attacks against castles, including Tottori Castle and Takamatsu Castle (in present-day Okayama).

In 1583, Mitsunari participated in the Battle of Shizugatake. According to the "Hitotsuyanagi Kaki," he was in charge of a mission to spy on Shibata Katsuie's army and also performed a great feat of Ichiban-yari (being the first to thrust a spear at an enemy soldier) as one of the warriors on the front line. Later, he served in the Battle of Komaki and Nagakute in 1584. That same year, he worked as a kenchi (survey magistrate) at Gamo County in Omi Province.

In 1585, Mitsunari was appointed as administrator of Sakai, a role he took together with his elder brother Ishida Masazumi. He was appointed one of the five bugyō, or top administrators of Hideyoshi's government, along with Asano Nagamasa, Maeda Gen'i, Mashita Nagamori, and Natsuka Masaie. Hideyoshi made him a daimyō of Sawayama in Ōmi Province, a five hundred thousand koku fief (now a part of Hikone). Sawayama Castle was known as one of the best fortified castles during that time. In January 1586, he hired Shima Sakon, who was renowned as a wise and

courageous commander.

In 1588, Mitsunari was placed in charge of the famed "sword hunt" conducted by Hideyoshi in an effort to disarm the nonmilitary bulk of the population and preserve peace.

In 1590, he campaigned against the Hōjō clan, where he commanded the Siege of Oshi and captured Oshi Castle. In 1592, Mitsunari participated in the Japanese invasions of Korea as one of the three bureaucrats with Mashita Nagamori and Asano Nagamasa.

In 1597, Mitsunari was ordered by Hideyoshi to persecute Christians. However, he showed sympathy to Christianity by minimizing the number of Christians he arrested and trying hard to appease Hideyoshi's anger (see 26 Martyrs of Japan). In the same year, Mitsunari also reportedly worked to end the war with Korea and China.

After the death of Hideyoshi and the death of Maeda Toshiie in 1599, Mitsunari formed an alliance of Toyotomi loyalists to stand against Tokugawa Ieyasu. In the mid 1600s, Mitsunari besieged Fushimi Castle before marching into direct conflict with Tokugawa's alliance at Sekigahara. Since daimyo from across Japan were forced to side with either Ieyasu or Mitsunari (with the exception of the Toyotomi clan, which was the common overlord of both sides), the battle came to be known as the decisive battle that split the nation in two. On October 21, he and his allies were defeated at the Battle of Sekigahara. Mitsunari sought to escape but was caught by villagers. He was beheaded in Kyoto and his head publicly displayed. His remains were buried at Sangen-in, a sub-temple of Daitoku-ji, Kyoto.

According to popular theory, in 1598, after the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the government of Japan had an accident when seven military generals consisted of Fukushima Masanori, Katō Kiyomasa, Ikeda Terumasa, Hosokawa Tadaoki, Asano Yoshinaga, Katō Yoshiaki, and Kuroda Nagamasa planned a conspiracy to kill Ishida Mitsunari. However, despite the traditional depiction of the event as "seven generals against Mitsunari," modern historian Watanabe Daimon has pointed out that actually there were more generals involved in conflict against Mitsunari, such as Hachisuka Iemasa, Tōdō Takatora, and Kuroda Yoshitaka, who also brought their troops and entourage to confront Mitsunari.

The reported reasons for this conspiracy were the dissatisfaction of those generals towards Mitsunari, caused because he wrote poor assessments and underreported their achievements during the Japanese invasions of Korea. Some, such as Tadaoki, also accused Mitsunari of other mismanagement during his tenure under Hideyoshi. At first, these generals gathered at Kiyomasa's mansion in Osaka Castle, and from there they marched to Mitsunari's mansion. However, Mitsunari had learned of this from a report by a servant of Toyotomi Hideyori named Jiemon Kuwajima and fled to Satake Yoshinobu's mansion together with Shima Sakon and others to hide. When the seven generals found out that Mitsunari was not in his mansion, they searched the mansions of various feudal lords in Osaka Castle, and Kato's army also approached the Satake residence. Mitsunari and his party escaped from the Satake residence and barricaded themselves at Fushimi Castle. The next day, the seven generals surrounded Fushimi Castle with their soldiers as they knew Mitsunari was hiding there. Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was in charge of political affairs in Fushimi Castle, attempted to arbitrate the situation. The seven generals requested that Ieyasu hand over Mitsunari, but Ieyasu refused. Ieyasu then negotiated a promise to let Mitsunari retire and to review the assessment of the Battle of Ulsan Castle in Korea, which had been a major source of this incident. He also had his second son, Yūki Hideyasu, escort Mitsunari to Sawayama Castle.

However, historians like Daimon, Junji Mitsunari, and Goki Mizuno have pointed out that the primary and secondary source texts about the incident suggest that it was more of a legal conflict between those generals and Mitsunari, rather than a conspiracy to assassinate him. Under this theory, Ieyasu's role was not to physically protect Mitsunari from physical harm but rather to mediate the legal complaints from the military faction figures against Mitsunari. Considering these facts, a more proper term to describe this incident is "the military generals' lawsuit against Mitsunari," rather than "Seven generals' conspiracy to kill Mitsunari" .

Nevertheless, historians viewed this incident not just as simply personal problems between those generals and Mitsunari but rather as an extension of the political rivalries of greater scope between the Tokugawa faction and the anti-Tokugawa faction led by Mitsunari. After this incident, those military figures on bad terms with Mitsunari would later support Ieyasu during the conflict of Sekigahara. According to the Keicho Kenbunsho, on the eve of the Battle of Sekigahara, even his close ally Otani Yoshitsugu warned Mitsunari, saying, "You are hated by the daimyos, so if you raise an army, those who sued you last year will become your enemies." Muramatsu Shunkichi, writer of "The Surprising Colors and Desires of the Heroes of Japanese History and Violent Women," gave his assessment that the reason Mitsunari failed in his war against Ieyasu was due to his unpopularity among the major political figures of that time.

Ukita Hideie (宇喜多 秀家; 1572 – December 17, 1655) was a Japanese samurai and daimyō of Bizen and Mimasaka Provinces (modern Okayama Prefecture) and one of the Council of Five Elders appointed by Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Son of Ukita Naoie, he married Gōhime, a daughter of Maeda Toshiie. Having fought against Tokugawa Ieyasu in the Battle of Sekigahara, he was exiled to the island prison of Hachijō-jima, where he died.

Hideie's father, Ukita Naoie, was daimyō of Bizen Province and initially opposed, but later sided with Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Naoie died in 1582, and Hideie became the head of the Ukita clan. As Hideie was still young (10 years old), it was Hideie's uncle (Ukita Tadaie) who acted as leader of the Ukita army until Hideie came of age; in particular, Tadaie served on behalf of Hideie as a commander in numerous battles (under Toyotomi Hideyoshi). However, during the siege of Bitchū Takamatsu Castle in 1582, Nobunaga was assassinated on June 2 of that year, but the siege continued until the castle fell two days later. Hideyoshi raced back to Kyoto, leaving the Ukita clan in charge of Bizen, Mimasaka, and newly taken parts of Bitchū Province. The Ukita were also to keep watch on Mōri Terumoto to the west.

In 1585, Hideie's forces under Ukita Tadaie led 23,000 men against Toyotomi's forces in the Shikoku campaign against Chosokabe Motochika. In 1586, Hideie was married to Hideyoshi's adopted daughter, Gōhime. (She had been adopted by Hideyoshi from Maeda Toshiie). Later, he participated in the Kyushu Conquest in 1587. In 1590, Hideie joined Hideyoshi's military campaigns in the Odawara campaign against Hōjō Ujimasa.

Following the unification of Japan under Hideyoshi, in 1592, Hideyoshi appointed Hideie as field marshal for the First Korean campaigns, in which he commanded the "Reserves Division." In 1593, he was wounded in the failed siege of Haengju.

Later in 1597, Hideie became a "Chief Commander of the Army of the Left" in the Second Korean campaigns, returning in 1598 to serve as one of Hideyoshi's five counselors (Council of Five Elders) along with Maeda Toshiie, Uesugi Kagekatsu, Mōri Terumoto, and Tokugawa Ieyasu.

Ukita Hideie took part in the Battle of Sekigahara. In the field, his army fought against Fukushima Masanori. Hideie's forces began to wane and were steadily overcome by the forces of Fukushima Masanori due to the latter's superior troop quality. The

disparity in combat effectiveness may have been attributable to the prior insurrection within the Ukita clan, which caused many senior samurai vassals of the Ukita to desert and join the Tokugawa faction. Hideie was thereby forced to enter Sekigahara with fresh recruits of rōnin mercenaries to fill the gap left in his army. This proved fatal over the course of long term combat against the Fukushima clan's more disciplined and trained regular troops; the Ukita clan ranks began to break and finally collapse under pressure despite outnumbering the Fukushima.

Ōtani Yoshitsugu (大谷 吉継; 1558 or 1565 October 21, 1600) was a Japanese samurai of the Sengoku period through the Azuchi-Momoyama period. He was also known by his court title, Junior Assistant Minister of Justice, or Gyōbu-shōyū (刑部少輔). He was born in 1558 to a father who was said to be a retainer of either Ōtomo Sōrin or Rokkaku Yoshikata. He became one of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's followers. He participated in Toyotomi's Odawara campaign and Korean campaign.

Ōtani Yoshitsugu is well known in Japan for two main aspects: his leprosy and his friendship with Ishida Mitsunari.

While it has not been determined that Yoshitsugu actually suffered from leprosy, rumors circulated that Otani Yoshitsugu was suspected of being the culprit in the 1587 massacre incident at Osaka, where thousands of people were slaughtered. In relation to this, the Hongan-ji Diary (also known as the Uno Shusui Nikki) circulates a rumor that Yoshitsugu was a leper who needed corpses to eat to cure his disease.

In 1599, when the relationship between Ieyasu and Maeda Toshiie became strained and rumors of an attempted conspiracy to storm the Tokugawa residence spread, Yoshitsugu accompanied Fukushima Masanori and other military commanders of the Toyotomi clan to the Tokugawa residence to guard Ieyasu. Later, when rumor of a plot to assassinate Ieyasu by Maeda Toshinaga emerges, Yoshitsugu leads an army to Echizen with the inner circle of Ishida Mitsunari, who had been ousted by Ieyasu.

In the same year, a riot occurred within the Ukita clan, as several of the Ukita clan vassals, such as Togawa Tatsuyasu, Sadatsuna Oka, and others, rebelled against Hideie. The Togawa Family Genealogy first cites the chaos within the domain caused by the alleged unfair land survey carried out by Nakamura Jirobei, Osafune Kii-no-kami, and Ukita Tarozaemon. In response, Sakakibara Yasumasa and Yoshitsugu were appointed as inspectors to mediate this incident. As mediation lacked progress, Yoshitsugu finally decided to allow the rebellious senior vassals to leave the Ukita clan household. The Todai-ki records that Yoshitsugu believed the senior retainers were at fault, while Ieyasu believed Hideie was the one who was responsible. In the end, Yasumasa successfully reconciled the case, and the armed riot was resolved without bloodshed.

Before the Mitsunari-Ieyasu war broke out, Yoshitsugu was said to have repeatedly tried to persuade Mitsunari of the futility of his actions. However, seeing the staunchness of his friend's convictions, Yoshitsugu joined his cause after mulling it over for several days. At the time, Yoshitsugu's health was deteriorating, making him nearly blind. He could not stand up, let alone fight. He was led to the battleground in a palanquin.

In 1600, as Mitsunari told his intention to oppose Tokugawa Ieyasu, Yoshitsugu warned him about the possibility of many daimyo lords who would instead support Ieyasu against Mitsunari. Yoshitsugu said, "You are hated by the daimyos, so if you raise an army, those who sued you last year will become your enemies." Furthermore, Yoshitsugu also cited the difference in the amount of koku, the number of soldiers, and the amount of material resources between Ieyasu and Mitsunari, as well as the difference in military experience and ability, and said that there was no way Mitsunari could defeat Ieyasu.

In 1599, Yoshitsugu gathered his men and moved with the Tokugawa troops as far as

Tarui Castle. According to the Keicho Kenmonshu, Mitsunari was at Sawayama Castle and invited Yoshitsugu to his realm. Though blind due to his illness as he entered the gates, Yoshitsugu was appalled to find armed soldiers awaiting him and developed a silent grudge toward Mitsunari. Undeterred, Mitsunari introduced him to his vassal, Shima Kiyooki. Kiyooki flipped Yoshitsugu's perceptions of the Western army, but he wanted to remain within Ieyasu's ranks, as he believed Mitsunari could not win. However, for one reason or another, Mitsunari was able to convince Yoshitsugu to defect and join the Western army.

His other activities before the Battle of Sekigahara are not clearly known, but he was said to have suggested Mitsunari relocate his main base the night before the conflict. Yoshitsugu led an army of 6,500 for the battle; he commanded 600 troops and had three subordinates: Hitatsuka Tamehiro with 900 troops, his son, Ōtani Yoshikatsu, with approximately 2,500, and Kinoshita Yoritsugu with 1,000. Other daimyo under command of Yoshitsugu: Toda Katsushige with 1,500 troops.

During the battle, Yoshitsugu's troops were outnumbered in a successful attack led by Kobayakawa Hideaki; Yoshitsugu committed suicide, and his troops retreated shortly thereafter. Amidst the confusion within the Otani clan troops, Toda Katsushige was slain by the Tokugawa forces. The Ōtani retreat left the Western Army's right flank wide open, which Masanori and Hideaki then exploited to roll the flank of the Western Army. Mitsunari, realizing the situation was desperate, also began retreating his troops. Meanwhile, Western Army commander Shima Sakon was engaged by the troops of Kuroda Nagamasa, who had taken a detour to the north to flank the Mitsunari and Sakon positions. In the end, Sakon was shot and fatally wounded by a round from an arquebus.

7. historical context

As the conclusion of the Battle of Sekigahara has served as the de facto beginning of the Edo period, and more generally, of the return of stability to Japan, in 1664, Hayashi Gahō, Tokugawa historian and rector of Yushima Seidō, wrote:

Evil doers and bandits were vanquished and the entire realm submitted to Lord Ieyasu, praising the establishment of peace and extolling his martial virtue. That this glorious era that he founded may continue for ten thousand upon ten thousand generations, coeval with heaven and earth.

Jakob Meckel, (28 March 1842 – 5 July 1906), a general in the Prussian army and foreign advisor to the government of Meiji period Japan, once analyzed the map of the forces distribution at the Battle of Sekigahara. Jakob deduced that the Western Army, due to greater numbers and better positions on higher ground, should have won. At first, Jakob was skeptical with a Japanese staff officer's explanation that it was the Eastern army had won, only believing so after the officer explained to him about the

flow of the battle.

20th-21st century Japanese historians such as Kasaya Kazuhiko, Mizuno Goki, Watanabe Daimon and others pointed that among major factors which influenced the result of the battle of Sekigahara, it was the perceived unpopularity of Ishida Mitsunari and the resentment of many powerful daimyo lords of that time, particularly those who involved in the Japanese invasions of Korea, as they felt their achievements during the campaign was undermined by Mitsunari's report, or even Mitsunari's own mismanagement under Hideyoshi.

One notable example was in 1598, when several daimyo lords, which colloquially known as the "Military Faction" of Toyotomi government, such as Fukushima Masanori, Katō Kiyomasa, Ikeda Terumasa, Hosokawa Tadaoki, Asano Yoshinaga, Katō Yoshiaki, Kuroda Nagamasa, Hachisuka Iemasa, Tōdō Takatora, and Kuroda Yoshitaka brought their troops and entourage to storm Ishida's residence to confront Mitsunari. At first, those daimyo lords gathered at Kiyomasa's mansion in Osaka Castle, and from there they marched to Mitsunari's mansion. However, Mitsunari had learned of this from a report by a servant of Toyotomi Hideyori named Jiemon Kuwajima, and fled to mansion together with Shima Sakon and others to hide. The heated situation forced Mitsunari to even flee and hid himself at the Satake Yoshinobu's residence, and then at Fushimi Castle, Before Tokugawa Ieyasu himself act as mediator of the dispute to calm those daimyo who resented Mitsunari.

Even Kobayakawa Hideaki's fief of Chikuzen and Chikugo was confiscated due to the rumored Mitsunari's slander against him on the aftermath of Korean war. It was said that Hideaki held grudge towards Mitsunari as he thought the confiscation of his fief was because Mitsunari gave him bad assessment During the siege of Ulsan. However, Watanabe Daimon warned that such rumor was baseless as Hideaku was not involved in the siege of Ulsan, and the rumor of Mitsunari influenced the confiscation of Hideaki's domains was probably just because the political mood and historical bias

during that time, where many tends to blame Mitsunari for everything goes wrong prior to Sekigahara battle. Nevertheless, Daimon still pointed out that Mitsunari already made too many enemies the moment he started hostility against Ieyasu, as according to the Keicho Kenbunsho, on the eve of the battle of Sekigahara, even his close ally Otani Yoshitsugu warned Mitsunari, saying, "You are hated by the daimyos, so if you raise an army, those who sued you last year will become your enemies.". Furthermore, Yoshitsugu also cited the difference in the amount of Koku, the number of soldiers, and the amount of material resources between Ieyasu and Mitsunari, as well as the difference in military experience and ability, and said that there was no way Mitsunari could defeat Ieyasu.

Yūichi Goza, Assistant Professor at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, concludes that Mitsunari naively overestimated the authority of Toyotomi clan, while in reality, many daimyo were pragmatic enough to prioritize following Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was viewed as extremely powerful figure of the time. Goza pointed out several indications one of them is the surprising letter of Mitsunari with the indication he believes he still could persuade Fukushima Masanori to join him to oppose Ieyasu. Similarly, Toshi Kohara, a Japanese anthropologist and professor emeritus of Rikkyo University, believed that despite those daimyo were originally vassals of Hideyoshi, they are convinced that fighting for Ieyasu and opposing Mitsunari was the best course for the interest of Hideyoshi's heir, Toyotomi Hideyori.

Kazuto Hongo, researcher from the University of Tokyo, remarked that Sekigahara campaign was essentially more of Ieyasu's political victory rather than military one. This took account from most political and factional advantages Ieyasu has secured that ultimately become critical factors for the outcome of this war, including the approval from the mother of Hideyori, Ōmandokoro, for his operation.

According to one historical record from Chikugo Province, Tachibana Muneshige was once advised by his senior retainer, Komono Masutoki, to side with the Eastern Army,

saying that the Western Army had no chance of winning. However, Muneshige replied that he does not care about winning or losing.

The participants of the Battle of Sekigahara are listed below, with corresponding troop count estimates (in tens of thousands):

	<i>Daimyō</i>	<i>Kokudaka</i> (hundreds)		<i>Daimyō</i>	<i>Kokudaka</i> (hundreds)
Western Army	 Mōri Terumoto	121.0	Eastern Army	 Tokugawa Ieyasu ○	256.0
	 Uesugi Kagekatsu	120.0		 Maeda Toshinaga	84.0
	 Satake Yoshinobu	54.0		 Date Masamune	58.0
	 Shimazu Yoshihiro ○	73.0		 Katō Kiyomasa	20.0
	 Ukita Hideie ○	57.0		 Fukushima Masanori ○	24.0
	 Ishida Mitsunari ○	19.4		 Hosokawa Tadaoki ○	18.0
	 Konishi Yukinaga ○	20.0		 Asano Yoshinaga ○	16.0
	 Mashita Nagamori	20.0		 Ikeda Terumasa ○	15.0
	 Ogawa Suketada •	7.0		 Kuroda Nagamasa ○	18.0
	 Ōtani Yoshitsugu ○	5.0		 Katō Yoshiaki ○	10.0
	 Wakisaka Yasuharu •	3.0		 Tanaka Yoshimasa ○	10.0
	 Ankokuji Ekei ○	6.0		 Tōdō Takatora ○	11.0
	 Kobayakawa Hideaki •	37.0		 Mogami Yoshiaki	24.0
	 Oda Hidenobu	13.5		 Yamauchi Kazutoyo ○	6.0
	 Chōsokabe Morichika ○	22.0		 Hachisuka Yoshishige	17.7
	 Kutsuki Mototsuna •	2.0		 Honda Tadakatsu ○	(10.0)
	 Akaza Naoyasu •	2.0		 Terazawa Hirotaka ○	8.0
	 Kikkawa Hiroie •	(14.2)		 Ikoma Kazumasa ○	15.0
	 Natsuka Masaie ○	5.0		 Ii Naomasa ○	(12.0)
	 Mōri Hidemoto ○	(20.0)		 Matsudaira Tadayoshi ○	13.0
	 Toda Katsushige ○	1.0		 Tsutsui Sadatsugu ○	20.0
	 Sanada Masayuki	4.0		 Kyōgoku Takatomo ○	10.0

Below is a chronology of the events leading up to and shortly following the Battle of Sekigahara:

May 7 – Ieyasu asks Uesugi Kagekatsu for explanations for his military mobilization. Kagekatsu refuses Ieyasu.

June 8 – Ieyasu calls his allies to punish the Uesugi.

July 12 – Ieyasu holds a meeting in Osaka to plan the punishment of the Uesugi, attended by Hosokawa Tadaoki, Date Masamune, Mogami Yoshiaki, Satake Yoshinobu and Nanbu Toshinao.

July 26 – Ieyasu leaves Fushimi Castle after meeting with Torii Mototada.

August 16 – Mitsunari meets with Ōtani Yoshitsugu and convinces him to take sides against the Tokugawa.

August 17 – Ishida Mitsunari, Ankokuji Ekei, Ōtani Yoshitsugu and Mashita Nagamori meet in Sawayama and agree to ask Mōri Terumoto to become commander in chief of the alliance. Nagamori secretly sends Ieyasu news about the meeting.

August 19 – Siege of Tanabe: while Hosokawa Tadaoki's army was en route to attack Uesugi and Mitsunari's Western Army, Ikoma Chikamasa's forces under Onoki Shigekatsu attack Tanabe Castle against Hosokawa Fujitaka.

August 22 – Mōri Terumoto arrives at Osaka Castle and takes command of the Western Army.

August 23 – Battle of Gifu Castle: Western-aligned Oda Hidenobu is besieged and defeated by Ikeda Terumasa, Ikeda Sen and Fukushima Masanori of the Eastern Army.

August 27 – Siege of Fushimi, led by Mitsunari and Kobayakawa Hideaki.

August 29 – Ieyasu establishes his headquarters in Oyama, Shizuoka to discuss strategy with allies.

August 30 – Battle of Asai: Maeda Toshinaga of the Eastern Army holds back the forces of Niwa Nagashige and Uesugi Kagekatsu.

September 1 – Siege of Shiroishi: Uesugi Kagekatsu loses Shiroishi Castle to Date Masamune's pro-Tokugawa troops.

September 6 – Fall of Tanabe Castle to the Western Army. Fujitaka enters Kameyama Castle, governed by Maeda Shigekatsu in Tanba.

September 7 – Tokugawa ally Maeda Toshinaga attacks his brother, Toshimasa, and

besieges Daishoji Castle. The commander of the garrison, Yamaguchi Munenaga, commits seppuku.

September 8 – Fall of Fushimi Castle: Torii Mototada and Matsudaira Ietada die.

September 10 – Ieyasu returns to Edo Castle from Oyama.

September 15 – Mitsunari's Western army arrives at Ogaki Castle.

September 29 – Nabeshima Naoshige and other Western Army generals besiege Matsuoka Castle. The Eastern Army occupies the heights of Akasaka, near Ogaki Castle.

September 29 – Fall of Gifu Castle to the Eastern Army. Tokugawa Hidetada heads towards Nakasendo.

September 30 – Mōri Hidemoto lays siege to Anotsu Castle, held by Tomita Nobutaka.

October 1 – Mitsunari returns to Sawayama Castle from Ogaki, asking Terumoto to march. Terumoto has been at Osaka Castle defending Toyotomi Hideyori.

October 7 – Ieyasu leaves Edo with 30,000 men heading towards Tokaido.

October 9 – Tokugawa Hidetada reaches Komoro, Nagano, and against the orders of his father, diverts his forces towards Ueda.

October 12 – Ieyasu passes through Shimada in Suruga. Hidetada camps in Sometani village to besiege Ueda Castle, held by Sanada Masayuki.

October 13 – Ieyasu passes through Nakaizumi in Tōtōmi. Mōri Hidemoto and Kikkawa Hiroie enter Mino and set up camp near Mount Nangu. Western Army commanders Mōri Hidekane, Tachibana Muneshige and Tsukushi Hirokado besiege Ōtsu Castle, held by Kyōgoku Takatsugu.

October 14 – Ieyasu receives a secret messenger from Kobayakawa Hideaki, who offers him support. Naoe Kanetsugu leads the Uesugi forces against Mogami Yoshiaki at the Siege of Hasedo.

October 16 – Hidetada abandons the Siege of Ueda Castle and heads to Mino.

October 19 – Ieyasu arrives at Gifu Castle in Mino. Kuroda Yoshitaka defeats Ōtomo Yoshimune and other Ishida-allied generals at the Battle of Ishigakibara.

October 20 – Ieyasu moves to Akasaka. The two coalitions make contact at Kuisegawa, near Akasaka. The Eastern force retreats to Sekigahara. The Western coalition heads to Sekigahara from Ogaki Castle.

October 21 – Battle of Sekigahara

October – Siege of Yanagawa: the last battle of the Kyūshū Sekigahara Campaign.

October 30 – Date Masamune tries to conquer Fukushima Castle but fails and retreats. (In May 1601, during the Battle of Matsukawa, Masamune is repelled by Honjō Shigenaga.)

November 5 – Naoe Kanetsugu calls for a full withdrawal of all Uesugi forces, putting an end to Uesugi's campaigns in the north.

8.. Neutralizing Mt. Nangu

The fateful Battle of Sekigahara.

Mount Nangu, located in the south-east of Sekigahara, is the place where the Mouri clan of the West Army encamped. When you pass under the gateway of the shrine with Mt. Nangu in the background, the main shrine of Nangu Taisha comes into view. What catches people's eyes is the beautiful vermillion color. The beauty and the majesty of the vermillion colored buildings, such as the tower gate and the shrine, are breathtaking.

The exact year of construction is unknown, but according to the shrine's legend, it already existed in the myth era in the times of Emperor Jinmu, the first emperor. Later, around the reign of the tenth emperor Sujin, the shrine was restored to the emperor at its current location as "Nakayama Kanayamahiko Shrine".

The name of "Nakayama Kanayamahiko Shrine" was also listed as the best shrine of Mino area on "Engishiki", which was written in the Heian period. In later periods, the

shrine came to be known as "Nangu Taisha" because of its location south of the provincial capital, and was worshipped by many people. During the battle of Sekigahara, the shrine was attacked and burned to the ground. The shrine was reconstructed in 1642 by the Shogun Iemitsu Tokugawa, to fulfill the wishes of the local people. The current vermillion colored buildings were built at this time.

The shrine is sometimes called "'Camellia Shrine'", because there is a forest of camellias within the property. Looking toward the shrine from the forest of camellias, you see Mount Nangu in the background, and it is a profound view filled with mystery.

In the Hokuriku region, on July 19, 15,000 soldiers of the Western Army laid siege to Tanabe Castle, where Hosokawa Yusai (1534-1610, 細川幽斎) had taken refuge in support of Ieyasu. Hosokawa's main force, led by his eldest son Tadaoki, had been deployed to fight Uesugi in the Tohoku region, leaving only about 500 defenders at Tanabe Castle. By the end of July, the castle was on the verge of falling. However, Yusai, a renowned cultural figure, chose to resist not just with arms but with culture. Many soldiers in the Western army had studied Waka under Yusai. Out of respect for their teacher, their attacks gradually weakened, with some resorting to firing blank shots. In addition, Yusai was taught the secrets of Kokin Waka poetry through oral tradition. Fearing that the 'Kokin Denju' tradition would be lost if Yusai died, the 107th Emperor Goyozei repeatedly urged the castle to surrender, but Yusai continued to refuse. Finally, the Emperor issued an imperial order for peace between the two armies. On September 13, just two days before the Battle of Sekigahara, Tanabe Castle surrendered. By keeping the 15,000 soldiers of the Western Army pinned down at Tanabe Castle, Yusai's resistance weakened the Western Army's overall strength. In the Battle of Sekigahara, where the Eastern and Western military strength were evenly matched, his strategy contributed greatly to the victory of the Eastern Army.

These letters explained their rewards and additional territory upon victory. The content was different from Mitsunari's, in which he preached the "duty of loyalty" to the

Toyotomi family. Of course, Mitsunari also wrote a letter offering a reward, but because the contents were an unrealistic and extravagant guarantee, many of the warlords became skeptical, and it is said that this was one of the reasons they distanced themselves from Mitsunari. Ieyasu, a great admirer of the Rikuto, a book on the art of war, followed one sentence: “The relationship between lord and vassal is based on the interests,” and he challenged the war for supremacy as a feudal lord.

9.. The Decisive Betrayal

Kobayakawa Hideaki

The most famous defector was Kobayakawa Hideaki, the twenty-year-old commander of fifteen thousand troops on Mount Matsuo on the Western Army's southern flank.

He had been promised the entire Chūgoku region by Ieyasu five hundred thousand koku of new territory if he switched. He hesitated through the morning. When Ieyasu's arquebusiers fired ranging shots at his stationary line just after noon, he charged downhill not against Ieyasu but against his own ally Ōtani Yoshitsugu. Within an hour the Western Army folded.

Ieyasu paid the bill. Hideaki was given Bizen and Mimasaka, fifty-five domains' worth of fertile rice plains, a holding of 510,000 koku that should have made him one of the great lords of the new order.

He held it for two years. Edo-period accounts agree he descended into compulsive drinking, declined rapidly into paranoia and physical illness, and died in 1602 at twenty one. His line ended without an heir. The Kobayakawa family was extinguished within months. Edo period folklore claimed the ghost of Ōtani Yoshitsugu haunted him to death.

Wakisaka Yasuharu

Wakisaka Yasuharu commanded a smaller contingent on the same flank, a veteran of the Korean invasions and a Toyotomi insider.

He defected at almost the same moment as Kobayakawa. Ieyasu kept him in the Awaji domain he already held only thirty thousand koku, no upgrade, despite the secret promises that had brought him in. The implicit signal was clear: betrayal earned survival, not reward. Wakisaka served loyally for the rest of his life and his line continued, but Awaji was a strategic backwater. He died in 1626 a man who had bet everything on a switch and broken even.

Kuchiki Mototsuna and Ogawa Suketada

The two smaller defectors fared worse than Wakisaka. Kuchiki Mototsuna, who turned at roughly the same minute as Kobayakawa and Wakisaka, was permitted to keep his small Tamba domain but was politically frozen never trusted enough for major office.

Ogawa Suketada was reduced from thirty thousand to seven thousand koku within two years, on charges Edo-period historians considered fabricated, and his line was extinguished in 1610.

Kikkawa Hiroie: The Loyal Traitor

The fifth and least discussed defector was Kikkawa Hiroie, who controlled the Mōri clan's huge but stationary force on Mount Nangū above the Tokugawa right flank.

Kikkawa had reached a private agreement with Ieyasu's representatives in advance: in exchange for a guarantee that the Mōri's 1.2 million koku domain would be preserved intact, Kikkawa would block the Mōri commander Mōri Hidemoto from descending the mountain to attack. Kikkawa kept his word. The Mōri force, the largest single contingent in the Western Army, sat motionless on the mountain for the entire battle, asking repeatedly for permission to advance and being told by Kikkawa that it was 'still too early.

After the victory, Ieyasu broke the agreement. The Mōri were stripped of three-quarters of their territory and reduced to the small Hagi domain of 369,000 koku. Kikkawa Hiroie spent the rest of his life being blamed by his own clan for the loss, and the Mōri of Hagi spent the next 268 years quietly nursing a grudge. The grudge surfaced in 1868: it was the Mōri of Hagi, more than any other domain, who organized the Meiji Restoration and finally brought down the house of Tokugawa.

11. Aftermath of the war

The Battle of Sekigahara was the last major conflict between the western and eastern armies. With Mitsunari's coalition shattered, Ieyasu was able to capture Sawayama and Ōsaka castles in a matter of days. Mitsunari was beheaded in Kyōto within a month. At the formal conclusion of the war, Ieyasu stripped profitable lands from those prominent daimyō who opposed him and redistributed them among his allies, among whom were Kobayakawa Hideaki and Kikkawa Hiroie. Ieyasu installed Toyotomi Hideyori at Ōsaka Castle so that the Toyotomi vassals of the defeated coalition would look more favorably upon Ieyasu's bloody campaign. Finally, in 1603 Emperor Go-Yōzei elevated Ieyasu to shōgun, the first of a line of Tokugawa shōguns

that kept the peace for over 260 years.

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